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RESEARCH NOTE: Wearing Body-Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and 
Do Not Reduce Police-Use of Force: Results From A Global Multisite Experiment 
 
ABSTRACT 
Police use of force is at the forefront of public awareness in many countries. Body-worn-
videos (BWVs) have been proposed as a new way of reducing police use-of-force as well as 
assault against those who wear them. To date only a handful peer-reviewed randomised-trials 
have looked at the effectiveness of BWVs, primarily focusing on use-of-force and 
complaints.  We sought to replicate these studies and add assaults against police officers as an 
additional outcome. Using a prospective meta-analysis of multi-site, multi-national RCTs 
from ten discrete tests with a total population of +2 million, and 2.2 million police officer-
hours, we assess the effect of BWVs on rates of (i) police use-of-force and (ii) assaults 
against officers. Averaged over ten trials, BWVs had no effect on police use-of-force 
(d =  .021;  SE = .056;  95% CI − .089 to .130), but led to an increased rate of assaults 
against officers (d = .130;  SE = .059;  95% CI .016 to .245). As there is evidence that 
police cameras may increase the risk of assaults against officers, more attention should be 
paid to how they are implemented. Likewise, since other public-facing organisations are 
considering equipping their staff with BWVs (firefighters, private security, traffic wardens), 
the findings on risks associated with BWVs are transferrable to those occupations as well.  
 
 





Page 2 of 15 
 
Research note: Wearing Body-Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers and Do Not 
Reduce Police-Use of Force: Results from A Global Multisite Experiment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Violence by the police and against the police undermines the rule of law (Kirk, 2011; Tyler 
1990). Recent cases of killings by the police, particularly of unarmed minority civilians, have 
raised concerns about due process and justice (Kennedy, 2011). These events mirror a 
developed body of research on police legitimacy, accountability and transparency in social 
sciences (Tankebe, 2014). More than any other behaviour, “use-of-force by police officers 
has the potential to decrease public trust in the police. While most citizens recognize the 
occasional need for force, the overall frequency of force used by police and force that is 
perceived to be excessive are clearly of concern to the public” )Stewart, Henning and Renauer 
2013:1). So what would it take for the police to act with fairness and restraint when 
interacting with citizens?  
At present, there is a worldwide uncontrolled social experiment taking place with one 
potential answer to this question: equipping police officers with body-worn-videos (BWVs) 
in order to improve procedural compliance by officers and ‘take the heat’ out of encounters 
with citizens. This social experiment – underpinned by feverish public debate and billions of 
dollars of government expenditure around the world (Friedman, 2015) – is one where robust 
evidence can, just, keep pace with the adoption of the new technology (Lum et al, 2015; 
White, 2014). Our contribution here is to create that evidence base with the largest multi-site 
prospective randomized-controlled-trial in the history of criminal justice research. In this 
note, we report that, averaged over ten trials camera use had no average effect on police use 
of force, while in some sites BWVs appear to increase use of force against suspects compared 
to control conditions. In addition, crucially, BWVs also appear to lead to an increased rate of 
assaults against officers. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Police use of force is arguably the most controversial aspect of police work. The problem, 
pushed vividly into public consciousness by the rasping last breaths of Eric Garner, is viewed 
by some across society as suggestive of a reliance on force too often, and in excess of what is 
often required, by police officers in the United States (Daily Mail, 05/07/2015).  Yet police 
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violence is not just a major concern for America. In a span of 10 years (2005-2014), 5,000 
people from Brazil have been killed by police (Amnesty International, 2015).  Deaths and 
serious injury in British police custody led to several judicial reviews over the years (Home 
Office, 2015; Teers, 2015). Globally, the grim roll-call of police brutality threatens police 
legitimacy in the eyes of the populace they purport to ‘protect and serve’(Tankebe, 2014). 
Leaving aside the severest form of police violence, many jurisdictions struggle with 
the lack of accountability surrounding non-lethal use of force by police. For example, 
prompted by the recent spate of police killings in the United States, US police departments 
were asked to release data on use of force against citizens in 2014. The released data drew an 
ignominious response from the press (e.g. New York Times, 09/14/2014), including 
prompting The Guardian to start compiling data on police killings (The Guardian, 
01/07/2015).
1
 Where such information does exist, it is piecemeal or historical in nature. For 
example, in 2001 the IACP published a report that detailed police use of force in the US, 
summarising this as a low frequency event in the region of 3.61 incidents per 10,000 police-
public encounters (IACP, 2001; Alpert & Dunham, 1995, 1997, 2004; Alpert & MacDonald, 
2001).  
In other jurisdictions such as England and Wales, there is no national, organised 
collection of data on police use-of-force, barring the use of Tasers. This means that it is not 
possible to establish baseline levels of use-of-force for English and Welsh police forces. If so, 
then much of what is published on use-of-force may be confounded by this lack of systematic 
evidence (McDowall et al., 2015). Conversely, when looking at assaults against police 
officers in the US there are long-run time-series going back several decades based on the 
Uniform Crime Report. For example, the FBI LEOKA data (FBI 2014) and data collected by 
the Police Roll of Honour Trust in the UK (Police Roll of Honour Trust 2015) show that 
assaults against officers have declined, as have deaths of officers (but there are notable 
limitations to how UK data on assaults against police are recorded).
2
 At the same time and 
very similar to the recording of use of force, these datasets are generally incomplete and 
inconsistent. Thus, we have no reliable systematic figures on the extent of “force” in police-
public encounters, nationally as well as more locally. 
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Notwithstanding the data concerns, we know that police use of force can be 
contentious, leading to challenges of the delicate relationship between the police and the 
public. Despite incredible efforts to better these ties, it often seems that the existing initiatives 
– training, altering procedures and in-house as well as public inquiries – are insufficient. 
Within this framework – and by means of response to these perceived threats to the 
legitimacy of the police in the US – President Obama’s administration announced an 
additional “$263m of spending investment package that will increase use of body-worn 
cameras […] add more resources for police department reform, and multiply the number of 
cities where Department of Justice facilitates community and local law enforcement 
agencies engagement” (White House, 2014). This reaction complements a view of BWVs as 
a panacea to America’s problem with policing (Floyd et al. v. City of New York, 2013); or 
perhaps, the problem with America’s police.  
The basic motivation for police BWVs is to reduce: (i) use of force by police and (ii) 
complaints against the police. Change in these outcomes is expected to lead to myriad 
benefits, including enhanced police legitimacy and professionalism. Increased officer safety 
is another. The theoretical basis for the use of cameras – that being monitored changes 
behaviour - is well established in many fields of research (Adair, 1984; Sherman 1990). 
Nevertheless, many encounters with police are filmed, but such films do not appear to have 
altered police behaviour. Research on other types of cameras – CCTV and various forms of 
surveillance – tells us that their effects are limited (Welsh and Farrington, 2008). So why 
would police wearing a camera make a difference? In the psychological, social, political and 
natural sciences, work has focused on the idea of deterrence (Nagin, 2013). Deterrence 
requires a ‘guardian’, a rule-enforcer, with high certainty and celerity of punishment. The 
greater the perceived likelihood of apprehension by a rule-enforcer, the less likely rule 
breaking is to occur – across nearly all types of human behaviours (e.g., Becker 1978). CCTV 
typically fails because people are not aware they are being filmed.  Police BWVs – at least as 
implemented in our trials – fulfil these requirements and are well placed as a mechanism to 
regulate police-citizen encounters (Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland 2014; Ariel 2016a; 2016b). 
Leaving aside the political and legal issues surrounding the use of “on-cop” 
surveillance technology (Harris, 2010), the question we try to answer is: can BWVs reduce 
the use of force? In the published, peer-reviewed experiments on this topic to date,
3
 police use 
                                                                
3 On other matters associated with the casual effect of BWCs in policing, see Ready and Young (2015); Grossmith 
2015; and Owens et al (2014).  
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of force was reduced compared to control conditions (Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland 2014; 
Jennings, Lynch and Fridell 2015; see also Grossmith et al., 2015; Owens, Mann and 
McKenna, 2014). However, a handful of novel experiments provide insufficient evidence to 
justify the billions of public funds being spent globally on police body-worn technology 
(Ariel, Farrar and Sutherland 2014; White House, 2014). Given the current state of police-
public relations, robust empirical evidence is urgently needed (see the recent systematic 
review by Lum et al 2015), even if only to act as a catalyst for institutional change and better-
informed debate. This urgency is underlined when nearly 5,000 of more than 14,000 local US 
police departments and countless countries worldwide are already equipped with BWVs, 
without evidence to their efficiencies, cost-effectiveness, or wider societal impacts.  
 
METHODS 
Our data come from 10 randomized controlled trials from eight police forces in six 
jurisdictions, covering a total population of more than 2,000,000 citizens.  Two forces had 
had two separate geographic areas included in the trial; hence the greater number of trials 
than police forces. Information on participating sites is presented in Table 1 below. Jointly, 
the trials involved 2,122 officers in eight police departments, with 2,188,712 officer-hours.
4
  
Each study was a two-arm trial that randomly assigned officer shifts to either experimental 
(with cameras) or control (no cameras) conditions, on a weekly basis. This resulted in 4,915 
shifts being assigned (M=491.50; SD=276.99 per site), with no differences between treatment 
and control conditions in terms of the distribution of shifts (Table 2). Beyond large-scale 
cluster-randomized designs – which would perhaps be a ‘gold standard’ design in this context 
if properly administered – randomizing shifts is the most practical approach to implementing 
BWVs trials with police as even small forces can leverage large sample sizes (Ariel, Farrar 
and Sutherland, 2014). Our pre-published protocol (see Supplementary Materials) states that 
officers doing ‘camera on’ shifts had to keep the camera on during their entire shift (typically 
between 8-12 hours) and inform members of the public during any encounter that they were 
wearing a camera that was recording their interaction (see Supplementary Materials).  This 
means that the intervention consisted of [camera + notification].  To be clear, the trial design 
meant that officers did not have discretion about when cameras were turned on: cameras were 
supposed to be kept on throughout their shift, during every encounter. The only exceptions 
                                                                
4 There are more departments than jurisdictions because some police forces are from in the same jurisdiction but 
cover different geographical areas. 
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were circumstances when officers responded to specific types of incidents that were pre-
agreed with senior staff in each force (e.g., when conversing with informants, serious sexual 
assaults, or major public events). 
The two outcomes reported here for all studies were whether an officer used force 
during a shift (if so, how many times) and whether or not officers were assaulted (if so, how 
many times). These were then standardised as rates per 1,000 arrests per shift because forces 
ranged in size. There are differences in how police forces define ‘force’ (e.g., incidents that 
do account compliant handcuffing or not), as well as how assaults against officers are 
recorded (e.g., physical and/or verbal) - with both likely to vary by jurisdiction and/or police 
force. To mitigate differences in how ‘force’ was defined, our analyses focus on any physical 
restraint on the force continuum (Terrill 2001; Garner et al. 1995) beyond the use of verbal 
commands during an arrest (so if an officer uses pepper spray, for example). A consistent 
benchmark of what level of force is included in the trial helps with comparability between 
sites, even if they have differing base rates for use-of-force. (The differing base rates do not 
affect the within-force results from the trials – the RCTs are testing between-group 
differences in each trial site – but may be important for understanding variation in outcomes 
between trials, particularly in light of the different base rates in use-of-force. We discuss this 
point below.) Assaults against officers – as noted above – can be more difficult to capture, 
because it depends on the willingness of the officer to report her assault (see Bierie 2015). For 
this study, we had to be pragmatic in how data on assaults against police were captured. 
Imposing new reporting requirements would have been problematic (particularly having this 
agreed across forces and jurisdictions). As such, we relied on the routine reporting 
requirements already in place.  
We used the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis v.2 software (CMA) to synthesise the 
results from the trials and present the overall results. Using standardised difference of means 
(Cohen’s d; Cohen 1992) to compare treatment and control conditions across all sites. We 
then used the standardised mean difference as a summary statistic in a meta-analytic 
procedure, and the corresponding 95% confidence intervals as a measure of reliability of the 
estimation procedure. As each trial uses the same design and outcomes then it is appropriate 
to combine and report them in this manner (Lipsey, 2001). The data inputted into CMA 
consisted of (i) the number of treatment and control shifts; (ii) rate of incidents of use of force 
per 1,000 arrests; (iii) and rate of recorded assaults on police officers on patrol per 1,000 
arrests in each shift. 
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Insert Table 1 and Table 2 here 
 
RESULTS 
We have two main results. First, there was no overall discernible effect of using BWVs on 
police use-of-force. Second, cameras increased the likelihood of an officer being assaulted 
during a shift compared to not wearing the cameras. Raw data from all sites are given in 
Table 1. Figure 1 is a forest plot with combined estimates from the fixed effects meta-analytic 
specification for police use of force per 1,000 arrests. The overall result was that there were 
no significant differences between treatment and control arms {d = .021; SE=.056; 95% CI -
.089 to .130)}. These results were heterogeneous (Q=17.90; p<.05; I
2
=49.7%) and this 
heterogeneity appears to be driven by (i) the 55% difference in the prevalence of use of force 
in treatment compared to control conditions in three studies (site names omitted); a result (ii) 
countered by negative findings by most sites (i.e. use of force increased in treatment vs 
control shifts) from seven trials (43% increase in prevalence). These puzzling results flip the 
theoretical basis for the study on its head: there was no reason to suspect that use of force by 
officers would increase when cameras were turned on, as these acts are virtually guaranteed 
to be caught on camera and should thus deter officers (as with the recent Samuel DuBose 
homicide; The Guardian 07/30/2015).  
To date, there is no reported evidence on the effect of wearing cameras on assaults 
against officers, but the working assumption has been that cameras would make officers 
‘safer’ (Jennings et al, 2013, but cf. Goodall, 2007). Figure 2 shows the synthesized results. 
Contrary to expectations, assaults against officers were higher when cameras were used (d 
=.130; SE=.059; 95% CI .016 to .245), but again with significant heterogeneity (Q=43.419; 
p<.001; I
2
=79.3%). Using the original metric, the rate of assaults against officers per 1,000 
arrests was 15% higher when cameras were present. In real terms this meant that for every 22 
assaults in control shifts per 1,000 arrests [(177/7977)*1000] there were 25 assaults in 
treatment shifts [(196/7700)*1000]. There were opposing results and effects where assaults 
increased came from the smallest studies (site names omitted).  Removing these smaller 
studies means that the result was non-significant, but the point estimate was again positive (d 
= .051; SE = .060; 95% CI -.066 to .169).  
 
Page 8 of 15 
 
Insert Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 here 
 
DISCUSSION 
The overall null use-of-force result may dampen the enthusiasm of those calling for cameras 
to be used by all police forces. Some may even see this as justification for body-worn 
cameras to be abandoned altogether. We urge caution before coming to any firm conclusions 
for three reasons. First, there are still more studies being conducted as part of this research 
and as results come in the synthesized results reported here may change. Second, despite the 
robust methods used in these studies from around the world, the data used represent a 
convenience sample of police forces, and experiences in other jurisdictions may vary. Third, 
as we acknowledge above, different jurisdictions have varying definitions of use of use or 
how assaults against officers are classified and this may affect the comparability of results 
between jurisdictions. Thus, an alternative explanation for the overall null result is that 
heterogeneity in how use of force was measured between the six jurisdictions accounts for the 
different results. That is, although the studies operated under the same research design 
protocol, differences in how police defined use of force might account for the variation 
observed between forces. However, this argument is countered by the fact that we 
implemented a consistent approach to measuring force across all sites. Additional sub-group 
analyses are needed; however, data on these issues are not presently available. This is one 
limitation this study faces, and future research will require addressing.  
Furthermore, the variability in our results could also tell us that the BWVs worked in 
some places, some of the time, but did not work in others. Compared to control conditions, an 
increase in use of force against suspects as a result of using BWVs is a puzzle. By virtue of 
deterrence alone, BWVs should increase compliance and subsequently less force will be used, 
yet BWVs were found to exacerbate force in some instances. We need to understand more 
about this. One direct explanation might be that BWVs escalate an already-inflamed police-
public encounter, which results in more rather than less force being used. It might be that 
when BWVs are introduced into some police-public interactions, the suspect, officer or both 
become more aggressive. 
Our second result on the increase in assaults against police – unexpected as it was – 
also demands attention. Does this mean that officers should be advised to remove BWVs 
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immediately? If the results are accepted uncritically, i.e. that BWVs increase the likelihood of 
assaults against officers, then this might be the conclusion one comes to. However, we cannot 
rule out alternative explanations at this stage. First, (yet un-evidenced) is the idea that with an 
‘objective’ record of events officers feel more able (or compelled) to report instances when 
they are assaulted. Second, officers may be less assertive (‘tone down’) because of 
monitoring and this could make them more vulnerable to assault. (Officers sometimes deal 
with people who would very much like to do them – and others – harm.)  Third, the strongest 
results for assaults against police came from the smallest studies – these may be atypical 
results driven by small sample variation. Finally, increased assaults against police may also 
be a corollary of decreased use of force in some instances. Whereas police may have taken a 
tit-for-tat approach – using force when assaulted as a form of ‘natural justice’ – cameras may 
inhibit the reactive use of force and give officers the impetus and/or confidence to report the 
incident. The question about the reason for the increased assaults is not something that can be 
left to debate, it must be scrutinised empirically. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the 10 participating sites 
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Table 2 Trial measures by treatment allocation within each participating site 
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Figure 1:  rate of use of force by officers per 1,000 arrests per shift 
 
Figure 2: assaults against officers as rate per 1,000 arrests per shift 
 
